Official Workbook PDF page source text

LCMS 2026 Convention Workbook: Reports and Overtures, PDF page 224

2026 Convention Workbook
189
OFFICER, BOARD, AND COMMISSION REPORTS
it there is no further appeal. It has the full effect of a presidential 
determination not to initiate formal proceedings upon an appeal for 
action, just delivered earlier in the process.
Specifically, the Bylaws provide for no latter-day review of the ad-
equacy of the material presented to the President that could void his 
concurrence and restore his ability to receive an appeal for action 
in the matter at hand. Bylaw section 2.14 in other places provides 
explicit opportunities for review of procedural adherence, as well 
as specific remedies. For processes that reach a panel (constituted 
only when a member has been suspended), the panel is empowered 
to consider compliance with the bylaw provisions; indeed, one of 
the sub-issues each panel decides is: “Was proper procedure fol-
lowed by the ecclesiastical supervisor in suspending the member 
of the Synod (Const. Art. XIII 2; Bylaws 2.14.3–2.14.10.3)?” (id., 
Decision, p. 57). There is a procedure for objections to alleged non-
compliance—when a matter is before a panel—that can result in 
corrective action and even a new panel (id., General Regulation V , 
p. 18). But the Bylaws of the Synod provide no authority—prior 
to an empanelment—to review the actions of ecclesiastical super -
visors (other than that they so empower the President, Const. Art. 
XI B 1–2; Bylaw 3.3.1.1.1 [b, d]; 3.3.1.2 [b–c]) and grant no au-
thority—not even to the President—to compel performance or to 
correct, outside established bylaw procedures and timelines, prior 
actions or failures to act. Here, the appeal for action and its at-
tendant prior concurrence are themselves instances of established 
bylaw procedures allowing the President to intervene upon the per-
formance of duties by the initial ecclesiastical supervisor; bylaws 
provide no further authority to—or means whereby any might—in-
tervene upon the intervention, especially after the fact.
When the President’s concurrence is officially requested under the 
provision in question, the President must determine, therefore, be-
fore he concurs, whether he is entirely satisfied with the adequacy 
of the record before him to allow his determination that there is no 
cause that the worker should be suspended, or further admonished 
under possibility of suspension, on the basis of the facts presented 
in the formal, written accusation. In case of any doubt in the Pres-
ident’s mind as to the completeness of the record before him that 
cannot be resolved by conference with the district president, he has 
the options either to not concur, which may prompt the district pres-
ident to revise his determination or initiate further investigation, for 
which more time can be allotted, or to take no action, allowing the 
district president to proceed with his own determination (id., Step 
2.5, p. 32). These options both preserve the potential for appeal for 
action to the President and for his subsequent independent investi -
gation of the charges and his admonition and/or suspension of the 
accused (id., Step 2.6, p. 33).
In summary, the commission finds: 
First: That a presidential concurrence once clearly given in response 
to a clear request under Bylaw 2.14.4.2 cannot be voided, so as to 
restore the possibility of appeal for action. The Bylaws provide no 
specific mechanism for an appeal for action to be revived follow-
ing a presidential concurrence under Bylaw 2.14.4.2. “Expulsion 
shall be executed only after following such procedure as shall be 
set forth in the Bylaws of the Synod” (Const. Art. XIII 2). Where 
the bylaws and attendant SOPM do not themselves provide means 
of procedural correction, the ability to correct procedural errors is 
severely curtailed. Where a concurrence is requested, the onus is 
on the Synod President to ensure that any doubt about sufficiency 
of the material before him is resolved before he grants any such 
concurrence. Once he has concurred, a subsequent discovery of the 
The constitutional right and duty to “promote and maintain unity of 
doctrine and practice in all the districts of the Synod” upon which 
the appeal for action is founded is the President’ s (Const. Art. XI 
B 3; Op. 16-2791; 2016 Res. 12-14) and not the accuser’ s. Where 
the President has concurred in a district president’s decision not to 
suspend, he has finally exercised, with regard to the matter at hand, 
his right and duty to intervene in the matter to “promote and main-
tain unity of doctrine and practice in all the districts of the Synod.” 
The concurrence mechanism of Bylaw 2.14.4.2 does not in essence 
prevent a matter from coming before the President of the Synod for 
review; it simply advances the President’s review of, and potential 
concurrence in dismissal of, a matter that might otherwise subse-
quently come before him as an appeal for action.
Prerequisite to obtaining such concurrence, the district president is 
to “convey [] to [the President of the Synod] the accuser’s formal 
written accusation, the record of [the district president’s] investiga-
tion, and [the district president’s] preliminary determination” (By-
law 2.14.4.2). It is the clear expectation of the bylaw that these items 
be conveyed fully, and to this the district president is duty bound 
(see also clear standards for what is to be included in the “record of 
the investigation,” SOPM for Bylaw section 2.14, December 2023, 
Flow Chart Detail, Step 2.3, pp. 31–32). It must be said, at least in 
passing, that a district president’s withholding of required infor -
mation from the President to obtain a concurrence and frustrate a 
potentially valid appeal for action would be a “violat[ion] … of the 
requirements or procedures” as described in Bylaw 2.14.10.2, with 
potential for the consequences there also described. 
It must also be said that the President must be aware he is granting 
a concurrence for him to have been said to have done so. Bylaw 
2.14.4.2 requires certain materials to be presented to the President 
within the framework of a formal request for concurrence in a mat-
ter involving doctrine and practice and a formal, written accusation. 
Clearly, if the President is not aware he is granting such concur -
rence (for example, if a district president in a conversation de-
scribes a situation without providing a formal, written accusation, 
and the President casually indicates approval of the district presi-
dent’s approach or conclusions), no such concurrence is granted. As 
the question is presented, however, there is no question of whether 
the President understood that he would be granting, and did grant, 
a concurrence upon materials presented to him that at least facially 
met the requirements of Bylaw 2.14.4.2. 
We now turn to the question at hand, which is of what options an 
accuser has if, after a concurrence has been delivered, he believes 
the “accuser’s formal, written accusation, the record of [the dis-
trict president’s] investigation, and[/or] [the district president’s] 
determination” were not fully delivered to the President, or fully 
reviewed by him. 
We deal with the latter part first. The question in its second aspect 
asks whether a failure of the President to review the record in full 
invalidates the concurrence. This, the dignity of the President’s of-
fice presumes (see “Third” below) but the bylaws do not clearly 
require, or present a definite standard for review of such, or provide 
a finder of fact to reach such a determination. This being the case, 
the commission has no authority to set a standard or provide a find-
er of fact regarding this aspect, and it will therefore not be further 
considered in this opinion.
Now to the first part, as to the full conveyance of the required ma-
terial to the President. The President’s concurrence is a finally dis-
positive act as regards the facts presented in the formal, written 
accusation. Of it there is no means of review provided, and from